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1. Private enforcement v Public enforcement of EC Law 
It would be hard to deny that the enforcement of Community legislation 
has up to now proceeded  by means of a private enforcement model, as 
opposed to the public one initially provided for by the EC Treaty. This has 
been particularly true in the field of social law, where European citizens 
have been ensured of substantive rights deriving from Community law   
more by national courts acting on Article 234 preliminary references  than 
by the European Court of Justice acting on Article 226infringement 
procedures. 
This is not to be seen merely as a  result of the inner weaknesses of 
the centralised public model based on infringement procedures. The 
absolute prevalence assumed over the years by the private enforcement 
model is rather to be understood as a corollary of the “twin pillars” of the 
Community legal order. The progressive consolidation of the doctrines of 
supremacy and - mostly - direct effect have altered the equilibrium 
between the public and the private route to the judicial enforcement of 
Community law, shifting the balance towards the latter.  
And indeed, had  the Court of Justice not “discovered” supremacy and 
direct effect
1, the enforcement of EC law would have been entirely left 
either to the eagerness of the individual Member states to comply with 
their duties, or to the willingness (or the possibility ) of the Commission 
to activate Article 226 proceedings
2. In either case, individual “Euro-
litigation as an enforcement strategy for European labour law”
3 would   
certainly not have played the role it has  actually been playing since the 
seventies. 
It is within this broad framework that (national) remedies and 
procedures have become a fundamental complement for the effectiveness 
of (European) substantive rights. The pivotal role of individual litigants 
claiming enforcement of EC rights before a national court explains the 
emphasis gained by judicial remedies within the case law of the European 
Court of Justice. And in fact, once  the preponderance of the private 
enforcement model
4 was acknowledged, it was unavoidable for the 
European Court to take into account the national sanctions and rules of 
procedure to be applied when disputing the effective enforcement of 
Community law. 
                                                 
1 For a stimulating overview of the most recent developments of direct effect doctrine, see  
(Prechal 2000). 
2 Or of the Member states to activate Article 227 proceedings. 
3 As (Bercusson 1996) at 145 explicitly defines it. 
4 Or, as others prefer to describe it, the “decentralised system of justice” of the Community 
legal order (Tridimas 2000) at 35. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF EC LABOUR LAW 3 
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1.1 Effective judicial protection: a principle born of (but not 
confined to) direct effect  
Reasons of conceptual clarification require  a distinction to be made 
between judicial remedies for the effective enforcement of rights deriving 
from Community law (A), and judicial remedies for  breaches of EC law 
(B). Nevertheless, it is also true that - as regards the contents of the 
general principle of effective judicial protection - the two aspects tend to 
overlap (§ 1.2).  
(A) The first body of judicial remedies - for the full effectiveness of 
rights deriving from Community law - refers to cases in which the 
relevant EC Directive has been correctly implemented by the national 
legislation, and yet its full and definite effectiveness requires the 
availability of both sound rules of procedure and “adequate” or 
“dissuasive” sanctions. As has been clearly stated, “there is no doubt that 
the requirements [of effective judicial protection] also apply in the case of 
infringements of national provisions which implement a directive.”
5 And it 
is  the case to add that this is by no means a surprising situation: it is 
quite possible that the substantive provisions of a Directive are correctly 
implemented by a Member state, without any judicial remedy for their 
violation being available. 
The Court of Justice has repeatedly considered this situation as 
incompatible with the full effectiveness of EC law. 
In a first phase, the Luxembourg judges relied upon the specific 
“enforcement provision” contained in Article 6 of the Equal Treatment 
Directive. In Von Colson,
6 they declared that - even if the  “substantive” 
part of the 1976 Directive had been implemented in the German legal 
order by art. 611bis  BGB - this was not sufficient to ensure that the 
Directive was “fully effective, in accordance with the objective which it 
pursues”, in the absence of adequate remedies for discrimination. More 
recently, the European Court stated in Coote
7 that national legislative 
provisions which were specially introduced in order to implement the 
Equal Treatment Directive must be reviewed in the light of the principle 
of effective judicial protection
8: according to the Court, the absence of 
remedies would be liable to jeopardise not the implementation of the 
Directive as such, but rather the “implementation of the aim pursued by 
the Directive”. 
                                                 
5 (Prechal 1997) at 5. Italics in the original. 
6 Case 14/83,Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891, on 
which see (Curtin 1985).  
7 Case C-185/97, Belinda Jane Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd. [1998] ECR I-5199 
8 Sometimes defined as the principle of “effective judicial control”, as in case 222/84 
Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651. 4                                                           ANTONIO LO FARO 
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In a second phase - and basing  on the duty of co-operation provided 
for by Article 10 of the Treaty - the Court of Justice extended the scope of 
its jurisprudence by requiring adequate national remedies to be available 
for the violation of rights conferred by EC law, even in the absence of any 
specific “remedies provisions” in the concerned directive. In Johnston
9, 
for instance, the Court declared that the principle of effective judicial 
control “underlies the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
states and is laid down in articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which 
must be taken into consideration in community law.” There should follow 
from this an extension of  effective judicial protection  beyond the field in 
which it was originally formulated, i.e. equal treatment: “if the Court is 
content to invoke the rule on effective sanctions in claims involving 
enforcement of the Equal Treatment Directive against private parties, the 
same should apply to any directly effective directive, provided that the 
substantive rights contained therein have been correctly implemented”.
10 
In a third phase – which is currently under way - the Court’s 
jurisprudence on effective enforcement has been, so to say, positivized in 
European legislation; sometimes by reproducing within the legislative text 
the precise wording previously used by the Luxembourg judges. And so it 
happens that in the proposal for the long-awaited “information and 
consultation” Directive
11 one finds the same “effective-proportionate-
dissuasive penalties” formula which appeared in earlier case law
12. In 
addition, the same formula is adopted in the proposal for the new 
amending Equal Treatment Directive
13. 
It is worth nothing, anyway, that the last generation of EC social 
Directives already contains specific “enforcement provisions” similar to 
that contained in Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive. The new 
2001 transfers of undertakings directive , for instance, obliges Member 
States to introduce “such measures as are necessary to enable all 
employees and representatives of employees who consider themselves 
wronged by failure to comply with the obligations arising from this 
                                                 
9 Johnston, see note n. 8. 
10 (Ward 1998) at 70. 
11 Article 7.2 of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European 
Community, COM (2001) def. 296 of 23.05.2001. 
12 Case 68/88, Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2965. 
13 Considerandum n. 12 and Article 6.2 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, 
vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, COM (2000) 334 of 7.06.2001.  JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF EC LABOUR LAW 5 
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Directive to pursue their claims by judicial process”
14. Still more explicit is 
the recent Framework Employment Equality Directive, requiring Member 
States to “ensure that judicial and/or administrative procedures, including 
where they deem it appropriate conciliation procedures, for the 
enforcement of obligations under this Directive are available to all 
persons who consider themselves wronged by failure to apply the 
principle of equal treatment to them, even after the relationship in which 
the discrimination is alleged to have occurred has ended”
15. It is easy to 
predict that this new generation of enforcement provisions will give fresh 
impetus to the principle of effective judicial protection intended as a 
remedy for the full effectiveness of rights that individuals derive from 
national legislation implementing EC law. 
(B) It has been clarified thus far that the need to guarantee effective 
judicial protection of rights that individuals derive from EC law, does 
constitute a  trouble even in those circumstances where the relevant 
Community directive has been transposed into the national legislation. 
However, since “effective enforcement” of Community law is not to be 
equated with implementation of EC directives, the model of private 
enforcement has developed beyond implementation and, sometimes, 
irrespective of implementation. 
This is why the principle of effective judicial protection has been 
primarily handled by the Court of Justice under the guise of a remedy for 
the breach of EC law;  b y  “ b r e a c h ”  o f  E C  l a w   meaning  those 
circumstances in which no national implementing legislation had been 
adopted at the time of the events submitted to the court, even though 
the national judge was in front of a dispute which, following the direct 
effect doctrine, should have been regulated by EC law.  
It is precisely in this kind of case that the Court of Justice had the 
opportunity to dwell upon the specific questions of procedure which are 
the object of this chapter: time limits, burden of proof and ex officio 
application of EC law by national judges. Questions such as those 
examined in Johnston
16,  Emmott
17 Marshall II
18,  Steenhorst-Neerings
19, 
                                                 
14 Article 9 Directive 2001/23/EC. A similar provision is present in the 1998 collective 
redundancies directive (Article 6 Directive 98/59/EC) 
15 Article 9 Directive 2000/78/EC. 
16 See note n. 8. 
17 Case 208/90, Emmott v Minister for Social Welfare and Attorney General [1991] ECR I-
4269. 
18 Case C-271/91, Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health 
Authority [1993] ECR I-4367, on which see (Fitzpatrick and Szyszczak 1994). 
19 Case C-338/91, Steenhorst-Neerings v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor 
Detailhande [1993] ECR I-5475. 6                                                           ANTONIO LO FARO 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona"  3/2002 
Johnson
20,  Van Schijndel
21, Magorrian
22, and Fantask
23  originated from 
disputes which at the time of the facts were covered not by national 
implementing legislation, but rather by Community rules that - due to 
their being clear, precise, unconditional and not requiring further Member 
state action - the Court considered as directly applicable. 
 
1.2 A unitary system of remedies for different functions of 
effective judicial protection 
Having described the two possible ways of viewing the function of 
effective judicial protection within the EC legal order, it should be pointed 
out that the Court of Justice has been  inclined to shape both of them in 
quite similar, if not identical, terms.  
Either in its representation as a remedy for the effective enforcement 
of transposed EC directives (§ 1.1.A), or in its variation as a remedy 
connected to the direct effect of non-transposed EC directives (§ 1.1.B), 
the principle of effective judicial protection has been constructed by the 
Court of Justice as a unitary system of substantive remedies and 
procedural issues responding to common requirements aimed at ensuring 
the full effectiveness of rights deriving from Community law. 
In this perspective, effective judicial protection could be depicted as a 
sort of transversal principle crossing through the three pillars of the 
Community private enforcement model: direct effect, indirect effect and 
State liability. 
According to European court case law, in fact, national remedies and 
procedures must be able to accord effective judicial protection, no matter 
whether the substantive right to be guaranteed derives from the direct 
effect of clear, precise and unconditional Community rules; or from an 
interpretation of national law consistent with the purpose of Community 
law; or from the State liability for failure to transpose Community law. 
Whichever of the three routes a substantive Community right has 
followed to reach the national legal order, it must be exercised in the 
light of a single principle of effective judicial protection: in all of the three 
cases mentioned above, the sanctions must be adequate and the 
procedural terms of the action not framed so as to render  the exercise of 
those rights excessively difficult. And it is, in fact,  easy to note that the 
“excessively difficult or practically impossible” test is proclaimed in 
                                                 
20 Case C-410/92, Johnson v Chief Adjudication Officer [1994] ECR I-5483. 
21 Joined cases C-403/93 and C-431/93,Van Schijndel and Van Veen v Stichting 
Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten [1995] ECR I-4705. 
22 Case C-246/96, Magorrian and Cunningham v Eastern Health and Social Service Board 
and Department of Health and Social Services [1997] ECR I-7153. 
23 Case C-188/95, Fantask A/S v Industriministeriet [1997] ECR I-6783. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF EC LABOUR LAW 7 
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exactly the same wording in direct effect cases
24 as well as in State 
liability cases
25; and the need for “adequate and proportionate” sanctions 
is evoked by the Court in direct effect cases
26, as well as in indirect effect 
cases
27, and even in infringement cases
28. 
The broad description of the rationale behind the EC system of 
remedies, as conducted so far
29, is aimed at pointing out two 
intermediate conclusions, which are essential to introduce the specific 
analysis that will follow. 
First, a preliminary analysis of  ECJ jurisprudence substantiates those 
views according to which “the requirement of judicial protection as an 
overriding principle of Community law has its origin in the far-reaching 
doctrine of direct effect”
30. This explains why procedural questions largely 
connected with the application of the direct effect doctrine - such as 
those relating to time limits - have gained greater magnitude in the case 
law of the Court of Justice. Nonetheless, it is also true that the Court’s 
jurisprudence on remedies has developed beyond its “direct effect” origin, 
embracing profiles of effective judicial protection not necessarily linked to 
direct effect and, hence, to non-implementation of Community directives. 
In this sense, it may be said that enforcement questions may arise 
irrespective of implementation/non-implementation of the EC rules 
involved. And this is why in the subsequent sections all kinds of cases - 
whether connected to implemented or a non-implemented Community 
legislation - will be taken into consideration. 
Second, the focus on indirect effect underlying the origins of the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence on remedies is also useful to make clear why the vast 
majority of remedy cases are equality cases. This did not happen by 
chance. To the extent that the chronicle of ECJ jurisprudence reveals a 
clear connection between effective remedies and direct effect, it is hardly 
surprising that the principle of effective judicial protection has been 
stated in disputes which originated from the non-transposition of directly 
effective Community provisions: i.e., and typically, equal treatment 
provisions, also due to the presence of art. 141 (ex art. 119). 
 
                                                 
24 Case 199/92, San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, para. 12. 
25 Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich and others v Italy  [1991] ECR I-5357, para. 43. 
26 Marshall II, see note n. 18. 
27 Von Colson, see note n. 6. 
28 Commission v Greece, see note n. 12. 
29 For a complete analysis see the chapter by B. Fitzpatrick in this volume. 
30 (Van Gerven 2000a) at 440. 8                                                           ANTONIO LO FARO 
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1.3 The specific questions of procedure  
The principle (and - to the extent that they are expressly provided - the 
specific provisions) of effective judicial protection requires that individuals 
claiming a Community right should be entitled to a “judicial remedy” 
before the courts. According to the European Court, a judicial remedy 
essentially consists of three things: access to judicial protection and 
sound rules of procedure, availability of interim measures, and adequate 
reparation for the infringement of these rights. As the last two are 
developed in other chapters in this volume
31, it is possible here to restrict 
the relevant facets of ECJ jurisprudence to the following areas of 
procedural law: time limits, burden of proof, and ex officio application of 
Community law; the first being  more extensively discussed than the 
others, as suggested by analysis of the most recent European 
jurisprudence .
32 
Probably because of their very same nature, these questions have 
been submitted to the attention of the European Court quite frequently; 
certainly more than other “enforcement” questions analysed in this 
volume (for example: more than those related to the administrative 
sphere). This is why investigation of these subjects cannot but heavily 
rely on European court case law, primarily developed through a series of 
Article 234 (ex 177) procedures giving rise to a number of quite technical 
questions that increasingly fill the agenda of European law debate. At the 
same time, it is precisely in the light of this intense judicial dialogue  that 
a comparative analysis of the rules of procedural enforcement should be 
conducted. This is indeed one of the fields of legal integration where 
European rules are destined to “cohabit” with national assets, as is 
unmistakably and typically revealed by the “comparability” or 
“equivalence” principle, according to which national procedural rules 
governing the enforcement of EC law must not be less favourable than 
those governing similar domestic actions
33. 
 
                                                 
31 For which see, respectively, the chapters by Jonas Malmberg and Michael Gotthardt in this 
volume. 
32 In the last decade, the portion of case law devoted to time limits (§. 2) has certainly been 
much more significant than those related to burden of proof (§. 3) and ex officio application 
of Community law (§. 4). 
33 The necessity to couple the “Community” and the “comparative” approach in the study of 
judicial remedies is emphasized by (Van Gerven 2000a). On the whole, the study of 
EC/Comparative law dynamics is increasingly referred to in the current debate as an 
unavoidable methodological stance in the future development of legal research. In 
connection with this, see the essays collected in (Sciarra, ed. by 2001) and the concluding 
remarks by S. Simitis in the same volume. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF EC LABOUR LAW 9 
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2. Time limits 
One of the main elements to be taken into consideration when 
substantiating a judicial remedy is undoubtedly related to a series of 
restrictions having to do with “time.” Indeed, this is precisely one of the 
profiles that have been repeatedly submitted to the attention of the 
European Court. In defining the essence of a judicial remedy, there can 
be three kinds of time-related questi o ns: a ) H o w m uch ti m e  do e s o ne  
have at his/her disposal in order to claim a right before a court? b) When 
does this amount of time begin to run? c) What are the retroactive effects 
of the claim brought into the judicial proceeding? Obviously, the three 
profiles are often interrelated within a single dispute; but for reasons of 
conceptual clarity, it seems appropriate here to deal with them 
separately. 
  
2.1 Time limits for bringing action 
The first question - determining the period of time individuals have at 
their disposal to bring a judicial claim - is neither new nor peculiar to the 
enforcement of rights conferred by EC law. On the contrary, all national 
systems have always had such limitation periods with a view to 
safeguarding legal certainty requirements. And the European Court also 
basically shared this view by asserting, in application of the principle of 
national procedural autonomy
34, that the laying down of reasonable time 
limits for the judicial enforcement of rights conferred by EC law, is not in 
and of itself contrary to their full effectiveness
35.  
This is not to mean that Community law has nothing to say in this 
regard. One of the two counter-limits of national procedural autonomy 
requires that national procedural remedies should not be less favourable 
than those relating to similar actions of a domestic nature nor framed so 
as to render the exercise of a Community right excessively difficult. An 
EC/comparative law exercise to review national time limits should 
therefore ascertain whether national time limits to bring action for the 
protection of Community rights - however dissimilar they may be 
between the member states - are able to satisfy the above-mentioned 
requirements of effectiveness.  
In this connection - and without any claim to exhaustiveness - some of 
the judicial developments that have taken place within domestic legal 
orders are worth mentioning to the extent that they may confirm or 
                                                 
34 See the chapter by B. Fitzpatrick in this volume. 
35 See, among many others, cases C-279/96, C-280/96 and C-281/96, Ansaldo Energia and 
others v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1998] ECR I-5025; C-231/96, EDIS v 
Ministero delle Finanze [1998] ECR I-4951; C-326/96, Levez v T.H. Jennings [1998] ECR I-
7835. 10                                                           ANTONIO LO FARO 
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contradict some aspects of that process of communitarization of national 
remedies perceived (or perhaps recommended) by some authors
36. 
It is interesting, for instance, to note that in some cases national timer 
limits to challenge before a court the validity of a dismissal have been 
somehow “communitarized” by national judges. In Germany and the 
Netherlands, for instance, the Bundesarbeitsgericht and the Hoge Raad 
have been ready to extend the time limits laid down in ordinary dismissal 
cases
37, when the contested dismissal is allegedly grounded on a transfer 
of undertaking, contrary to what Community law prescribes. The Dutch 
Supreme Court, in particular, set aside the six months’ limitation period 
usually applied to judicial claim in dismissal cases. Based on the uniform 
interpretation principle, it asserted that the national time limit provision 
was to be interpreted in conformity with the 1977 Transfers of 
Undertakings Directive, which does not allow for a term of limitation
38. It is 
worth mentioning that on that occasion the Supreme Court came to its 
conclusion in spite of the fact that the time limit in Community-related 
actions was not different from the limit provided for in similar actions of a 
domestic nature.  
Ultimately, what this kind of jurisprudence reveals is that, in some 
cases, national judges have gone even beyond what the non-discrimination 
principle would have required: in the above-mentioned Dutch case  law, a 
Community-related action was placed in a more favourable position than 
a merely domestic action would have been, thus suggesting that a sort of 
“procedural added value” could sometimes be found when a Community 
right is claimed in front of a national court.  
However, it would be difficult to invoke this peculiar case law as an 
expression of a deliberate and overall inclination to secure the effective 
enforcement of EC labour law. In the very same Dutch legal order, for 
instance, the two-month time limit laid down for the annulment of 
dismissals based on sex discrimination is, without any apparent reason, 
shorter than the six-month limit laid down for other kinds of dismissal, 
and therefore - contrary to what the equivalence principle would require - 
definitely less favourable than the one governing similar domestic 
actions. 
In general terms, there is no doubt that the national time limits for the 
judicial enforcement of Community rights do not correspond to any sort 
of uniformity, either among or within the Member states. Just to give a 
few examples, judicial actions brought before national courts in order to 
                                                 
36 See (Van Gerven 1995 and 2000a) 
37 Respectively three weeks and six months 
38 HR 29-12-1995, NJ 1996, 418 JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF EC LABOUR LAW 11 
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enforce the same fundamental sex equality principle are governed by a 
series of extremely varying limitation periods whose rationality would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain. Limitation periods vary not only 
from Member state to Member state
39, but also within a single Member 
state, from equal pay to equal treatment claims, and,  within a single 
Member State and a single kind of claim, even from court to court
40. 
As a sort of preliminary conclusion on the first “time-related” question, 
it is therefore possible to say that it  wholly falls into the realm of national 
procedural autonomy, without any counter-limit of effectiveness or 
equivalence having narrowed it. Hardly ever, and possibly never, has the 
Court of Justice made use of the two counter-limits to declare that the 
length of a national time limit was framed so as to render  the exercise of 
rights conferred by Community law virtually impossible; and seldom has 
it engaged in detecting whether a national time limit laid down for 
Community-related actions differs from that relating to similar actions of 
a domestic nature. If not else, this is because the investigation proves to 
be a very difficult task, since it is “often far from clear whether a purely 
domestic issue can be equated with a Community one”
41. 
Where the European court has certainly been most active and willing 
to develop effective enforcement jurisprudence - at least up to a certain 
stage - is rather in the second time-related question, which will be dealt 
with in the following section. 
 
2.2 When does the limitation period begin to run? 
If the respectful tribute paid to national procedural autonomy has avoided 
the Court to scrutinise the duration of national time limits, usually 
considered as “reasonable”, the second time-related question in the 
enforcement of EC labour law has certainly been more “Community-
influenced”.  
Fixing the starting date of a limitation period is actually no less 
important than fixing the very extent of it; particularly when - as happens 
                                                 
39 The time limit to challenge the discriminatory refusal of social security benefits, for 
instance, is six weeks in the Netherlands and six months in the UK. 
40 See, for instance, the Levez case (note n. 35), concerning the two-year limit on arrears of 
remuneration provided for by the UK Equal Pay Act; a provision operating in effect as a 
limitation to bringing action. According to the observation presented to the European Court 
by the UK government, the limit in question would not have been applied if the applicant 
had brought the action before an ordinary County Court instead of an Employment Tribunal.  
41 (Craufurd Smith 1999) at 294. The quotation refers to the first “national” (British) phase 
of the Preston case, which later arrived in Luxembourg following a preliminary reference 
raised by the House of Lords (case C-78/98, Shirley Preston and others v Wolverhampton 
Healthcare NHS Trust and others [2000] ECR I-3201). For an analysis of Preston, and of its 
second national phase, see infra §§. 2.2 and 2.3. 12                                                           ANTONIO LO FARO 
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with the application of Community law - the identification of the date at 
which the individual right can be claimed may not be so clear an issue. 
With regard to the very important Preston  case
42, for instance, it has 
been written that: “the central issue regarding the six-month limitation 
was not the imposition of the limit per se, but rather the date from which 
it should apply”.
43  
When dealing with time limits of this kind, in other terms, the source 
attributing the rights that are claimed in the judicial action should not be 
underestimated. In the case of Community derived rights, indeed, the 
normative source conferring the substantive right (usually a directive) 
presents some specific peculiarities as to the determination of its “coming 
into force”, i.e. as to determination of the moment at which the rights 
conferred by it become “effective” and therefore justiciable for the 
individuals concerned.  
This is what the ECJ has been willing to take into consideration in its 
famous, albeit much disputed and by now revised, Emmott 
jurisprudence
44. In that case - labelled by commentators as “devastating” 
and “revolutionary”
45 - the Court clearly stated what should be considered 
a natural precondition of any effective judicial protection mechanism: “so 
long as a directive has not been properly transposed into national law, 
individuals are unable to ascertain the full extent of their rights”. This 
state of uncertainty exists - according to the Emmott doctrine - precisely 
with regard to directives that, by being directly effective, would be 
capable of attributing individual rights even in the absence of any State 
intervention. To the extent that it is not acknowledged in due time by the 
applicant, however, even a directly effective directive may risk remaining 
ineffective, should the national time limit elapse without the individual 
having brought any judicial proceeding. This situation - the Court dared 
to assume in Emmot - would not be compatible with the full effectiveness 
of Community law: it would not be fair to allow a defaulting Member state 
to rely on (unaware) individuals’ delays in initiating proceedings in order 
to oppose claims based on Community law.  
This kind of procedural limitation usually arises in cases where a 
financial claim is brought - as far as labour law in concerned, typically, 
social security benefits. It is, however, also possible to imagine the 
effects of the issues discussed above on different kinds of claims. For 
example, in a situation where the Working Time Directive has not been 
                                                 
42 See the preceding note.  
43 (Busby 2001) at 493. 
44 See note n. 17. 
45 Respectively, (Szyszczak 1997) at 109 and (Flynn 2000) at 51. For earlier comments on 
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properly implemented, and an employer’s
46 negation of the directly 
effective right to annual paid leave has been disputed in court
47, it is one 
thing to make the time limit for the judicial action run from the day of the 
employer’s refusal - which would probably make the action impossible 
due to the expiry of the national time limit to bring judicial action; and it 
is quite another thing to make it run from the date on which the Working 
Time Directive was properly implemented into national law. This is why 
the European Court affirmed in Emmott that a limitation period laid down 
by national law cannot begin to run before a directive has been properly 
transposed: “only the proper transposition of the directive will bring that 
state of uncertainty to an end”. 
It is easy to understand, at this point, the reasons why Emmott was 
immediately disputed by many commentators laying emphasis on the 
serious consequences it was capable of having. As has been written, 
“Emmott meant that, by definition, actions based upon directly effective 
rights under directives could be brought at any time,  regardless of 
national limitation periods”
48. An outcome whose (financial) importance 
becomes immediately manifest when one realises that most of the time 
limit restrictions apply to cases concerning either benefits which have 
been unlawfully denied (mainly in the field of social security law), or 
charges which have been unduly paid (mainly in the field of tax law).  
As already mentioned, however, the Emmott jurisprudence was quite 
promptly curtailed by the very Court of Justice in its successive case law; 
so it would be possible to say that the Emmott principle - albeit never 
formally repudiated - is now considered in Luxembourg as “a moment of 
judicial madness”.
49  
It would not be accurate to say that the revisionist approach to 
Emmott has been linear and consistent. On the contrary, a number of 
                                                 
46 In view of the fact that the direct effect of clear, precise and unconditional Community 
rules is still confined to vertical relationships, the term “employer” is here to be read as any 
“emanation of the State” or any “body having special powers beyond those which result 
from the normal rules applicable to relations between individuals” (case C-188/89, Foster v 
British Gas [1990] ECR I-3313).  
47 On the direct effect of Article 7 of the Directive 93/104/CE, see the recent BECTU case 
(case C-173/99, The Queen and Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ex parte 
Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union, 26
th June 2001, not yet 
reported in the ECR. In the UK, the direct effect of the annual paid leave provision had been 
declared by an Employment Appeal Tribunal in the Gibson v East Riding of Yorkshire 
Council, 3
rd January 1999, in 631 IDS Brief 7. This decision was afterwards revised by the 
Court of Appeal on 21
st June 2000 in East Riding of Yorkshire Council v Gibson, in 665 IDS 
Brief 8. 
48 (Coppel, 1996) at 153. Emphasis added 
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different solutions have been experimented before arriving at the final 
and present stage.  
In  Texaco
50, for instance, a quite problematic diversity between the 
direct applicability of the Treaty and the direct effect of Directives was 
drawn, in order to restrict the Emmott principle only to the latter and to 
conclude that it is not contrary to Community law that a national time 
limit applicable to claims for repayment of duties levied in breach of 
Article 95 TCE could run from an earlier point in time than that from 
which the duties were discontinued. In this way, an opposite solution was 
given to a situation very similar, if not identical, to  the issues discussed 
in Emmott. In both cases, the expiry of a national time limit precluded 
the exercise of a Community right not to pay or to receive a sum of 
money; but the right not to pay unlawful charges under the Treaty was 
considered in different terms than the right to receive the financial 
benefits made available by Directive 79/7/EEC. A diversity of solutions 
that is, indeed, hardly justifiable. 
Another way of escaping Emmott  has been that of emphasising the 
peculiar events that had induced Mrs. Emmott to delay her judicial action. 
She had actually been ready to bring a proceeding in due time, but the 
Irish authorities advised her to wait until the judgement of the Irish High 
Court on another related dispute had been settled. When that moment 
arrived, however, the limitation period for bringing action had elapsed 
and Mrs. Emmott found herself deprived of any possibility of claiming her 
rights. This was sufficient for the Court to state that when the behaviour 
of national authorities is not as misleading as that of the Irish Ministry 
towards Mrs. Emmot, Community law does not exclude that a national 
time limit may begin to run even before a directive has been properly 
transposed.
51 
The starting date of a national time limit for bringing an action was 
also among the (many) issues disputed in the highly debated Preston 
case
52. Many of the claims submitted by British part-time workers 
discriminated against in access to occupational pension schemes risked 
being time-barred following application of sec. 2(4) of the Equal Pay Act, 
according to which no claim on equal pay may be brought later than six 
                                                 
50 Cases C-114/95 and 115/95, Texaco A/S v Middelfart Havn and others [1997] ECR I-
4263. 
51 So the Court stated, among others, in Fantask, see note n. 23; case C-290/96, Ministero 
delle Finanze v Spac Spa [1998] ECR I-4997, and in case C-228/96, Aprile Srl v 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1998] ECR I-7141. 
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months after the termination of employment
53. According to the 
applicants, such a time limit should have begun to run only from the date 
when UK law started to comply with Community law by banning all forms 
of indirect discrimination as far as membership in pension schemes was 
concerned; that is, from the coming into force of the Occupational 
Pension Schemes (Equal Access to Membership) Amendment Regulations 
1995. 
As was quite predictable, the European Court, called to declare its opinion 
following a preliminary procedure raised by the House of Lords, did not 
take any position on the matter, and it passed the hot potato back into 
the hands of the House of Lords, who were simply supposed to verify - in 
the light of the equivalence principle - whether the time limit in question 
was less favourable than those applying to similar domestic actions. The 
long-awaited response of the House of Lords arrived in early 2001
54. The 
Lords found that a sufficiently similar comparator to  the procedural rule 
in question was to be detected in the time limits applicable to claims for 
breach of contract. Since this time limit is six years and the time limit 
applicable to equal pay claims is six months, one could have expected the 
latter to be deemed as definitively less favourable than the former, and 
therefore set aside in the name of the equivalence principle
55. However, 
this was not the case for Lord Slynn of Hudley, whose subtle 
argumentation deserves to be entirely quoted: “there are thus factors to 
be set against the difference in limitation periods. As has already been 
seen the claim under a contract can only go back six years from the date 
of the claim whereas a claim brought within six months of the termination 
of employment can go back to the beginning of employment or 8 April 
1976 (the date of the judgement in Defrenne v Sabena)
56, whichever is 
the later. Moreover the claimant can wait until the employment is over, 
thus avoiding the possibility of friction with the employer if proceedings to 
protect her position are brought during the period of employment, as will 
be necessary since the six-year limitation runs from the accrual of a 
                                                 
53 “No claim in respect of the operation of an equality clause relating to a woman's 
employment shall be referred to an industrial tribunal […] if she has not been employed in 
the employment within the six months preceding the date of the reference”. 
54 H o u s e  o f  L o r d s ,  8
th February 2001. The judgement may be read at 
www.publications.parliament.uk/ pa/ld200001/ldjudgmt/jd010208/presto-1.htm. 
55 This was also the consideration which was put forward by (Ryan 2001) in footnote 84. 
According to the Author “it is arguable that the fact that time limits in other areas of labour 
law are longer than six months (six years in the case of breach of contract claims to a 
county court), or can be extended by a tribunal, means that sec. 2(4) fails the test of 
equivalence”. 
56 On the different problem regarding the retroactive effect of the claims submitted in 
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completed cause of action. It is in my view also relevant to have regard 
to the lower costs involved in the claim before an Employment Tribunal 
and if proceedings finish there the shorter time-scale involved. The period 
of six months itself is not an unreasonably short period for a claim to be 
referred to an Employment Tribunal. The informality of the proceedings is 
also a relevant factor. I am not satisfied that in these cases it can be said 
that the rules of procedure for a claim under section 2(4) are less 
favourable than those applying to a claim in contract. I therefore hold 
that section 2(4) does not breach the principle of equivalence”
 57. The 
only admitted withdrawal of national procedural autonomy in front of the 
principle of effectiveness of Community law was carried out in application 
of the “practically impossible” test, and it was represented by the 
particular solution offered by the House of Lords with regard to 
employment relationships resulting from a succession of fixed-term or 
temporary contracts. In such cases, strict application of the six -month 
time limit would have required a number of separate actions to be 
brought at the end of each period of service. This, according to the Court 
of Justice’s judgement, could not pass the “excessively difficult or 
practically impossible test”: “in the case of successive short-term 
contracts […] setting the starting point of the limitation period at the end 
of each contract renders the exercise of the right conferred by article 119 
of the Treaty excessively difficult”
58. This very reasonable argument was 
accepted by the Lords, who stated that in the case of “a succession of 
short-term contracts concluded at regular intervals in respect of the same 
employment”
59 the limitation period runs from the end of the last contract 
forming part of that relationship. 
The very instructive story of Preston,  from UK to Luxembourg and 
back, tells us how an interpretation of the equivalence principle entirely 
left to national courts may very closely resemble full recognition of 
national procedural autonomy.  
There is no doubt, indeed, that the recovery of national procedural 
autonomy has been the guiding star of post-Emmott jurisprudence in the 
field of time limits. Moreover, it seems quite clear that the restriction of 
Emmott to its own facts is to be seen as a sort of a-posteriori validation 
constructed by the Court in support of its politically (or financially) driven 
choice to leave Emmot aside. Anyway, if it is true that the uniqueness of 
Emmott is represented by the Court as definitively and explicitly linked to 
the peculiarity of the events giving rise to it, it is also true that this would 
                                                 
57 Para 30-31. 
58 Preston, para. 68. 
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not have been such a refined legal argument. Therefore much more 
subtle and interesting, from a systematic point of view, are  the other 
ways followed by the Court of Justice in order to draw a distinction 
between Emmot and the subsequent case law adopted in the field of time 
limits.  
Recalling the threefold partition of time-related questions announced 
at the beginning of §. 2, it is now possible to say that  the distinction 
between time limits to bring action (§. 2.1) and temporary restriction on 
back payments (§. 2.3) - however artful it may seem - was precisely the 
legal construction elaborated by the Court of Justice in order to justify the 
validity of its jurisprudential révirement as regards identification of the 
date on which the limitation periods begin to run (§. 2.2). This is what 
the final part of this section will be about. 
 
2.3 Time limits on the retroactivity of the claim 
The third time-related question arising in the effective enforcement of EC 
labour law deals with the retroactive effects of judicial claims brought in 
order to obtain a Community-derived right. This third question 
presupposes that the first two procedural limitations have been somehow 
overcome: i.e. that the judicial action has been brought within the 
national limitation periods, whenever they are considered to run from, 
and that  a proceeding has therefore commenced.  
Just as happens when disputing about the starting date of a limitation 
period, so what is usually involved when talking about the retroactivity of 
a claim  is a financial benefit; quite frequently a social security one. In 
these kinds of cases, retroactivity questions occur when the judicial 
action is brought by the employee long after the right came into 
existence - for instance, once the employment relationship has 
terminated - and when national provisions exist such as those providing 
that “no person shall be entitled [...] to any benefit in respect of any 
period more than twelve months before the date on which the claim is 
made”
60; or tose providing that “benefits for incapacity for work are 
payable not earlier than one year before either the date on which they 
are claimed
61. 
Now – just to stick to the latter proviso - what if the circumstances 
brought into the proceeding date back more than twelve months and at 
that time they were already covered by a directly effective EC provision?   
                                                 
60 The norm of the British Social Security Act 1975 disputed in the Johnson case, see note n. 
20. 
61 The norm of the Dutch Algemene Arbeidsongeschiktheidswet (General Law on Incapacity 
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In  Steenhorst-Neerings
62  - often described as the beginning of the 
removal of Emmott - a female employee was claiming a social security 
benefit based on the 1979 equal treatment in social security directive. 
Mrs. Steenhorst-Neerings claimed her rights before the national court in 
May 1988. The Court recognised that the direct effect of that directive 
had to be backdated to December 1984, i.e. the deadline assigned to 
Member states for transposition of the directive in question. Nonetheless, 
Dutch procedural law prescribed that the applicant could obtain the 
benefit only as from twelve months before the action was brought, i.e. 
May 1987. The question addressed to the European court was therefore 
whether a situation in which a directly effective EC rule was left deprived 
of any effect whatsoever for a whole two and a half years (from 
December 1984 to May 1987) was acceptable for Community law. 
In cases like this, it should be noted, what is disputed is not a time 
limit similar to that affecting Mrs. Emmott’s claim. Unlike  Emmott, the 
employee was not entirely barred from bringing an action; she was rather 
prevented from obtaining the full amount of benefits she could have 
received had the directive been transposed in due time. Is this a good 
reason to allow Member states to maintain national time limits depriving 
(for a certain period) Community law of any effectiveness? 
According to the Court of Justice’s post-Emmott jurisprudence, the 
answer to the question above is a definite yes. Once it had distinguished 
between procedural rules affecting the right to rely on Directives against 
a defaulting Member State, and procedural rules merely limiting the 
retroactive effect of claims made for the purpose of obtaining the relevant 
benefits
63, the Court had no difficulty in disallowing the former and 
accepting the latter. Nor is the application of national retroactive limits to 
claims aimed at obtaining either arrears of benefit or restitution of 
charges excluded by the principle of equivalence. As explicitly stated by 
the Court in EDIS
64,  the principle of equivalence does not oblige a 
member state to extend its most favourable rules governing recovery 
under national law to all actions for repayment of charges or dues levied 
in breach of Community law
65. 
                                                 
62 See note n. 19. For a comment see (Sohrab 1994). 
63  Steenhorst-Neerings,  para. 21. Similar wording is used in Johnson,  para. 30 (“the 
national rule does not constitute a bar to proceedings; it merely limits the period prior to 
the bringing of the claim in respect of which arrears of benefit are payable”). 
64 See note n. 35. 
65 In EDIS  the Court was asked whether Community law permitted actions for the 
reimbursement of charges paid in breach of a Community law to be subject to a time limit 
of three years, a period which differed from the limitation period (10 years) which Italian 
law laid down for actions for the recovery of sums paid between individuals when they were 
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In a perspective aimed at verifying the effective enforcement of EC 
labour law, the solution adopted by the Court is far from satisfactory; to 
the extent that accepting time limitations on the retroactivity of the claim 
could produce effects vastly similar to those deriving from the application 
of time limits for bringing the claim.  
By conceptually distinguishing between two kinds of time limit whose 
application often determined the same result of leaving employees 
dispossessed of their Community rights, indeed, the Court of Justice 
undoubtedly sacrificed the requirements of effectiveness on the altar of 
legal certainty and, most of all, of financial compatibility
66; as had already 
happened in the celebrated Barber case
67. It is the very same wording 
used by the Court that confirms this kind of interpretation: a national rule 
restricting the retroactive effect of claims for benefits “serves the 
requirements of sound administration, in particular as regards the need 
to preserve financial equilibrium in a scheme in which claims submitted 
by insured persons in the course of a year must in principle be covered 
by the contributions collected d u r i n g  t h a t  s a m e  y e a r ”
68 Even a rapid 
review of the case law which developed after Emmott, on the other hand, 
proves that almost all the grands arrêts of the Court of Justice in the field 
of time limits are the result of preliminary references raised from 
countries such as Ireland, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Italy; 
that is to say, the countries where the application of Emmott  would 
probably have determined the largest financial problems: either for the 
financial equilibrium of the social security schemes as far as the first 
three countries are concerned
69, or for the tax administration in the latter 
case
70. 
Leaving aside the quite anomalous Deutsche Telekom case,
71 the line 
of reasoning inaugurated with Steenhorst-Neerings  - explicitly and 
                                                 
66 As regards Steenhorst-Neerings, for instance, (Sohrab 1994) at 884 openly observes that 
“the ECJ allowed financial considerations to counterbalance - and defeat - the full remedy 
for past discrimination”. 
67 In Barber, the limitations on the retroactive effect of the judgement was clearly not due 
to a national procedural rule, but rather to a sort of brand new “Community time limit”. The 
effect, however - and, most of all, the financial motivation of the judgement - was quite 
similar to the one subtending the post-Emmott case law. 
68 Steenhorst-Neerings, para. 23. 
69 The disputes were social security related  in the UK cases Johnson, see note n. 20; Levez, 
see note n. 35; Preston, see note n. 41; in the Irish case Magorrian, see note n. 22; in the 
Dutch case Steenhorst-Neerings, see note n. 19. 
70 The disputes were tax related  in the Italian cases Ansaldo and EDIS see note n. 35; 
Aprile and Spac, see note n. 51; and in case C-343/96, Dilexport v Amministrazione delle 
finanze dello Stato, [1999] ECR I-399. 
71 In a burst of Europeanism probably unparalleled in any other Member state, the German 
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effusively confirmed in Fantask
72 - could still be deemed to be the guiding 
star of the most recent ECJ jurisprudence, notwithstanding some 
judgements apparently contradicting it.  
In  Magorrian
73, for instance, the occupational scheme applicable to 
mental health nurses awarded more favourable pensions to  employees 
having a minimum scheme membership of twenty years of full-time work. 
This proviso - clearly and undisputedly sex discriminatory
74 - had to be 
coupled with the Irish procedural rules concerning access to membership 
of occupational pension schemes
75, stating that the right to be admitted 
to a scheme is to have effect from a date no earlier than two years before 
the institution of proceedings. In the two years prior to the bringing of 
the claim, Mrs. Magorrian worked on a part-time contract, so  it was 
doubted whether her access to the most favourable pension scheme 
could be excluded, either partially or totally.  
Having again evoked the seminal distinction between national rules 
limiting the period in respect of which backdated benefits could be 
obtained, and national rules thoroughly preventing  access to a benefit, 
the Court considered the Irish time limit as falling within the latter 
                                                                                                                              
application of Community legislation on equal treatment. This applies even with regard to 
cases - such as those related to part-time discrimination in pension schemes - which may 
be more problematic as far as the retroactivity of the claim is concerned. The situation was 
so sensationally compliant with the full effectiveness of Community law that a German court 
wondered whether this was not too much. In particular, the Landesarbeitsgericht of 
Hamburg asked the European Court whether the prohibition of retroactivity contained in the 
“Barber Protocol” could prevail over the German constitution which specifically precludes a 
prohibition of retroactivity of equality claims. The apprehensions of the Landesarbeitsgericht 
had, of course, a financial ground. Specifically, the German court asked the Court whether 
the unlimited retroactivity permitted pursuant to the German Grundgesetz constituted a 
breach of Community law from the standpoint of disproportionate discrimination against 
nationals, such as the German pension funds affected by the claims. The answer of the 
Court of Justice - accustomed to dealing with diametrically opposed cases, concerning the 
compatibility of a national limitation of retroactivity rather than an unlimited retroactivity - 
was that the limitation in time of the possibility of relying on the direct effect of Article 119 
TCE, resulting from the judgment in Defrenne II, was to be intended only as a minimum 
requirement. Where national rules do not pose specific problems on the retroactivity of 
claims, in other terms, Community law imposes that retroactivity should go back, at least, 
to  8
th April 1986 (the date of Defrenne II). It follows that Community law does not preclude 
national provisions by virtue of which part-time workers are entitled to retroactive 
membership in occupational pension schemes even beyond that date. (case C-50/96, 
Deutsche Telekom AG v Schröder [2000] ECR I-743). 
72 See note n. 23. 
73 See note n. 22. 
74 The clear-cut jurisprudence on the matter dates back to Case 43/75, Defrenne v Société 
anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1976] ECR 455. 
75 Regulation 12 of the Occupational Pension Schemes (Equal Access to Membership) 
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typology, even if this was not the only possible understanding of the 
case
76.  
Anyway, even though the national time limit was set aside in 
Magorrian, this is not to be seen as a return to Emmott, since the “great 
divide” emerging from Steenhorst-Neerings and Fantask - inadmissibility 
of time limits excluding access to a Community right/admissibility of time 
limits reducing the amount of the benefits to be given or of the charges 
to be refunded - was still fully applied in the case. 
Also in the other case in which a national time limit was set aside - 
Levez
77 - the result was not dictated by a Court’s will to return to 
Emmott. On the contrary, the Court made all possible efforts in order to 
exclude any “return-to-Emmott” appraisal of its judgement. In the case 
of Mrs. Levez, once more, an equal pay claim was at issue, and again one 
whose full achievement was endangered by the notorious section 2(5) of 
the British Equal Pay Act 1970, according to which “no arrears of 
remuneration may be awarded in respect of a period more than two years 
prior to the date of commencement of proceedings”. The Court’s 
statement that “Community law precludes the application of a rule of 
national law which limits an employee’s entitlement to arrears of 
remuneration for breach of the principle of equal pay to a period of two 
years prior to the date on which the proceedings were instituted”, does 
not mean that the Court resuscitated Emmott. On the contrary, the Court 
openly affirmed that the two-year limit on back payments “is not in itself 
open to criticism”
78, to the extent that it does not prevent  access, but 
just limits the amount of the equal pay claim. How could it then be that 
the Court found the same national time limit inapplicable to the claim 
brought by Mrs. Levez? The fact is that Mrs. Levez’s claim had been 
delayed as a result of deception by her employer having falsely declared 
to her the amount of  salary paid to her male predecessor. It was 
therefore the misconduct of the employer and not the time limit in itself 
which was reproved by the European Court, thus leaving wholly 
untouched the validity of the by now well-established “great divide” 
carved in cases such as Steenhorst-Neerings and Fantask.  
                                                 
76 In a very careful analysis of the ECJ remedies jurisprudence in the field of equality, 
(Kilpatrick 2001) strongly contests the interpretation given by the Court. According to the 
author, the Irish rule of procedure was to be classified precisely among those limiting the 
amount  of a benefit, and not  access  to it. “Some doubts” on the accuracy of the 
understanding of the national rule in question are also cast by (Coppel 1998) at 259. 
77 See note n. 35. 
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And it is precisely such a “great divide” that was again applied by the 
Court in one of the most awaited judgements of the last few years: 
Preston. 
The answer given by the Court in Levez had led some commentators 
to foresee - with some degree of good reason - that “The respondents in 
Preston will be encouraged by the ECJ’s ruling in relation to the principle 
of effectiveness that, absent deceit by the employer, there is nothing 
unlawful about a two year limitation period”
79. 
Rather surprisingly, however, the Court’s judgement in Preston found 
precisely that there was indeed  something wrong in a limitation period 
excluding any payment in respect of a time earlier than two years before 
the date on which the proceedings were instituted
80. Something which 
patently concerned the great number of UK part-timers that had long 
been  excluded from occupational pension schemes
81. Following Preston, 
more than sixty thousand employees involved in the case obtained 
calculation of their part-time employment in their pensionable service as 
of 8
th April 1986
82, provided they are ready to pay the contributions 
relating to the period of membership concerned
83. 
The conceptual foundation of the solution adopted by the Court in 
Preston should be clear from what has  repeatedly been said  above: the 
“great divide” was again invoked by the Luxembourg judges assuming 
that “the object here was to claim retroactive membership of the scheme 
rather than retroactive arrears of benefit under the scheme”
84. According 
to the Court, the two-year limit in question “would deprive the persons 
concerned of the additional benefits under the scheme to which they were 
entitled to be affiliated”
85. Whether this was really the case, as a matter 
                                                 
79 Coppel J., The Decision of the ECJ in Levez v Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd, November 
2000, www.11kbw.com/Articles/Employment%20Law/jco_levezecj.htm 
80 This is the same sec. 2(5) of the Equal Pay Act already disputed in Levez. More precisely, 
the rule disputed in Preston  was  regulation 12(1) of the Occupational Pension Schemes 
(Equal Access to Membership) Regulations 1976, according to which the two-year limit was 
also to be applied to actions to secure equal treatment regarding entitlement to 
membership of an occupational pension scheme. 
81 In fact, until the Occupational Pension Schemes (Equal Access to Membership) 
(Amendment) Regulations 1995 prohibited, as from 31 May 1995, all direct or indirect 
discrimination on grounds of sex regarding membership of any occupational pension 
scheme. 
82 The date of Defrenne II, see note n. 74, by which the direct effect of art. 119 was clearly 
stated. 
83 Something which, according to (Busby 2001) at 497 will probably diminish the practical 
impact of Preston: “Given the passage of time relevant to some of the claims it is, thus, 
unlikely that many of the women involved will have access to the necessary funds”. 
84 (Kilpatrick 2001) at 28 of the manuscript.  
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of fact, is not at all certain, since it does not seem that difficult to argue 
that the application of the national rule would have just limited,  not 
excluded, membership to the occupational scheme
86. The more is true, 
that in the  same Preston  judgement the Court recognised - in a 
somewhat inexplicable paragraph contradicting what had been written 
some lines before - that “the procedural rule at issue does not totally 
deprive the claimants of access to membership”
87. 
Be it as it may, it is not the concrete outcomes of the ECJ 
jurisprudence that are interesting  to note here, but rather the 
strengthening of the conceptual tools progressively elaborated by the 
European court as regards the problem of time limits. By elaborating the 
“great divide” theory, the Court has somehow rationalised the way of 
looking at the different effects of different time limits in the judicial 
enforcement of Community law. Those procedural limits supposed to 
prevent any possibility of exercising a Community right are promptly set 
aside in application of the general “practical impossibility” test
88. On the 
contrary, those supposed to limit merely the “measure” of the right are 
still considered as invulnerable bastions of legal certainty.  
It is thus in the above-described terms that  the juridical 
conceptualisation leading  Court of Justice case law in the field of time-
limits is to be represented. And it is a construction that - in the search for 
a balance between national procedural autonomy and effectiveness of 
Community law - could not but be accepted as reasonable
89. The material 
classification of the different time limits in one or  other of the two 
conceptual categories just mentioned is, however, another matter. Here 
the Court of Justice has perhaps demonstrated  less lucidity, letting its 
choices be guided by contingent evaluations leading it “into a set of ad 
hoc, and often factually tenuous distinctions which disposed of the cases 
before it without providing any satisfying, long term coherence”.
90 
 
3. Burden of proof 
Matters related to the allocation of burden of proof in employment 
disputes have always been considered as a cornerstone of effective 
judicial protection, being one of those fields of law where procedures 
come very close to the substance itself of the rights conferred.  
                                                 
86 (Kilpatrick 2001). 
87 Preston, para. 43.  
88 See supra, § 1.2. 
89 From another perspective, the ECJ’s “great divide” is not at all considered as reasonable 
by (Sohrab 1994) at 882, who asks “why should partial enjoyment of a right be seen as a 
lesser denial of a person’s rights under a Directive?”. 
90 (Kilpatrick 2001) at 29 of the manuscript. 24                                                           ANTONIO LO FARO 
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The sensitivity of the different Member states’ procedural traditions 
towards the crucial role of burden of proof as a way of strengthening the 
effectiveness of substantive labour law rules has undoubtedly not been  
homogeneous. Certainly no Member state, for instance, could match  the 
extremely careful attention devoted to these issues by the Swedish legal 
order since  1937. At that time, the Swedish Labour Court established a 
quite advanced rule to be applied to disputes concerning right of 
association. According to this rule, the burden of proof is divided in such 
a way that the employee has to contend that a violation of the right of 
association has occurred, following which the employer has to prove that 
a particular reason existed for his action quite apart from the question of 
the right of association
91. As  can be seen, something very close to the 
rules prescribed in the Burden of Proof Directive. 
On the opposite extreme, other countries have not demonstrated an 
analogous sensitivity toward the issues in question. As concerns France – 
a country where  litigation on equality issues is traditionally scarce – a 
recent Community Report has underlined that “the burden of proof in 
discrimination cases poses considerable obstacles. The courts do not 
seem to be willing to follow the Community case law in this respect”
92. 
The reference to discrimination cases as a battlefield where the 
affirmation of an “effective” version of burden of proof is ascertained is by 
no means fortuitous or unintended. In fact, in a similar - and probably 
still more marked - way to what happened with the questions scrutinised 
in §. 2, the issues related to the role of evidential rules in the effective 
judicial enforcement of EC labour law have been primarily submitted to 
the attention of the European Court with specific reference to one 
particular substantive area of EC labour law: i.e. equal treatment 
between men and women. 
 After a decade of jurisprudential intervention on the matter (§. 3.1), 
the “equal treatment” origin of the Community principles on burden of 
proof encountered a coherent legislative achievement through the 1997 
Burden of Proof Directive. This “positivisation” of the Community 
evidential rules constitutes a peculiarity in respect of the time limit 
issues: whereas the latter - as has already been said  above - are almost 
entirely left to  jurisprudential interpretation, the former did in the end 
find a legislative source of regulation in what is probably the first and 
only piece of Community legislation entirely devoted to  regulation of the 
                                                 
91 See (Schmidt 1977) at 73. 
92 See the Report Monitoring, implementation and application of Community Equality Law, 
by the Legal Experts’ Group on Equal Treatment of Men and Women, European Commission, 
Directorate-General for Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs, Unit V/D.5, 
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procedural aspects of judicial enforcement of employment right (§. 3.1). 
More recently, other references to the burden of proof regulation are to 
be found in the two “equality” Directives: the so-called “Article 13 TCE 
Directive” implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin
93, and the other Directive, more 
specifically related to employment, establishing a general framework for 
equal treatment in employment and occupation.
94 Both of the Directives - 
coming into force in 2003 - provide for specific burden of proof 
provisions, having the peculiarity of one being  a photocopy of the 
other.
95  
This being said about the equal treatment characterisation of all the 
Community legislation concerning burden of proof, it should also be 
added that, since the early 1990s, Community rules on burden of proof in 
employment matters “emancipated” themselves from their equal 
treatment origin, trying to give rise to a (potentially) more general 
application of the effectiveness principle, as  will be outlined  in §. 3.2. 
 
3.1 Evidential rules built from equal treatment directives 
The first time the Court of Justice had to deal with a national evidential 
rule, it had to “condemn” a quite “tough” Irish rule giving  a State 
certificate the value of conclusive and insuperable proof. It was absolutely 
clear to the Court that such a rule could not be considered as compatible 
with an even minimal understanding of effective judicial protection. And 
indeed this is precisely what the Court stated: “The principle of effective 
judicial control […] does not allow a certificate issued by a national 
authority stating that the conditions for derogating from the principle of 
equal treatment […] are satisfied to be treated as conclusive evidence so 
as to exclude the exercise of any power of review by the courts”
96  
Following this first statement, the principle of effective judicial 
protection has  been invoked by the Court several other times, in cases in 
which the violation of the effective enforcement of Community equality 
law was not so blatant as in Johnston. This second - and very well-known 
- strain of judgements may be condensed in the triptych of judgements 
                                                 
93 Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 
94 Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 
95 Member States shall take such measures as are necessary, in accordance with their 
national judicial systems, to ensure that, when persons who consider themselves wronged 
because the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them establish, before a 
court or other competent authority, facts from which it may be presumed that there has 
been direct or indirect discrimination, it shall be for the respondent to prove that there has 
been no breach of the principle of equal treatment (Article 8 of 2000/43/EC and Article 10 of 
the 2000/78/EC Directives.  
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usually referred to when talking of burden of proof in the Community 
legal order: Danfoss,  Dekker and Enderby
97. In the first case, the 
essential correlation between evidential rules and the effectiveness of 
Community law was drawn from an interpretation of the Equal Pay 
Directive; in the second case, from an interpretation of the Equal 
Treatment Directive; in the third, from an interpretation of Article 119 
(now Article 141) of the Treaty. 
In both Danfoss  and  Enderby,  what was affirmed by the European 
Court was the need to shift the burden of proof from the employee to the 
employer when discussing  alleged wage discriminations. In the first case, 
however,  shifting  the burden of proof was not affirmed as a general 
unconditional  principle to be applied in any equal pay case. Rather, the 
Court related the application of the rule to the specificity of the pay 
system adopted in the particular undertaking concerned. It was stated, 
indeed, that it is for the employer to prove that his practice in the matter 
of wages is not discriminatory, if a female worker establishes that the 
average pay for women is less than that for men. However, this applies 
only in so far as “an undertaking applies a system of pay which is totally 
lacking in transparency”.
98 
Definitely more capable of general application - beyond the 
peculiarities of the case concerned - was the statement put forward in 
Enderby. In this case, the Court paid special attention in not limiting the 
need to shift the burden of proof only to the specific circumstances of the 
dispute
99. It is true that in Enderby too the “normal” principle - according 
to which onus probandi incumbit ei qui dicit - is clearly reaffirmed as the 
general rule to be applied to discrimination cases
100. However, the 
principle of effective judicial protection did allow - or, better, required – 
the Court to state that the onus  probandi has to shift when that is 
necessary to avoid depriving workers who appear to be the victims of 
discrimination of any effective means of enforcing the principle of equal 
pay. For this situation to occur, it suffices, according to the European 
Court, that two elements arise from the analysis of the case: a) an 
indirect discrimination alleged through  b) statistical prima facie evidence. 
“Where significant statistics disclose an appreciable difference in pay 
                                                 
97 Case 109/88, Handels-og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbunf I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening for Danfoss [1989] ECR 3199; case 177/88, Dekker v Stichting 
Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen Plus [1990] ECR I-3941; case 127-92, Enderby v 
Frenchay Health Authority and Secretary of State for Health [1993] ECR I-5535. 
98 Danfoss, para. 13. 
99 As the lack of transparency was in Danfoss. 
100 “In principle, the burden of proving the existence of sex discrimination as to pay lies with 
the worker who, believing himself to be the victim of such discrimination, brings legal 
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between two jobs of equal value, one of which is carried out almost 
exclusively by women and the other predominantly by men, Article 119 of 
the Treaty requires the employer to show that that difference is based on 
objectively justified factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of 
sex”
101. A plain application of the “impossible in practice” component of 
the effectiveness principle guided the pronouncement of the Court on that 
occasion: “Workers would be unable to enforce the principle of equal pay 
before national courts if evidence of a prima facie case of discrimination 
did not shift to the employer the onus of showing that the pay differential 
is not in fact discriminatory
102. 
Still connected to evidential rules, and yet related to a slightly different 
profile was the case submitted in Dekker
103. In that case, the issue at 
stake was whether it was contrary to the 1976 Equal Treatment Directive 
that a claim based on it could succeed only on condition that the 
employee also proved his employer’s fault. It is quite a recurrent 
phenomenon, in fact, for national systems to provide for procedural 
exemptions according to which the employer’s liability for discriminatory 
treatment is subject to proof of a fault attributable to him (at least this 
was the case as far as the Dutch legislation in Dekker was concerned). 
The position of the Court towards these procedural exemptions was clear-
cut
104. Furthermore, its judgement is to be considered as eminently 
significant in a more general perspective, since it was not that common - 
in a context still pervaded by the procedural autonomy doctrine - for a 
national procedural rule to be clearly considered as incompatible
105 with 
the effective enforcement of EC law.  
As  has already been said  above, the regulation of burden of proof in 
sex discrimination cases is the only procedural issue whose regulation has 
been positivized through a piece of Community legislation. In fact, 
Directive 97/80/EC takes its place along the path indicated by the Court 
of Justice’s jurisprudence. In the Consideranda of the Directive, the 
tribute paid to the Court’s authority is explicit
106 and its legislative 
                                                 
101 Enderby, para. 19. 
102 Enderby, para. 18. 
103 See note n. 97. 
104 “When the sanction chosen by the Member State is contained within the rules governing 
an employer’s civil liability, any breach of the prohibition of discrimination must, in itself, be 
sufficient to make the employer liable”, Dekker, para. 25. 
105 Clearly, the term “incompatible” is technically wrong, but it is  used here in order to 
stress the unequivocal firmness of the principle affirmed by the ECJ. 
106 “The Court of Justice has held that the rules on the burden of proof must be adapted 
when there is a prima facie case of discrimination and that, for the principle of equal 
treatment to be applied effectively, the burden of proof must shift back to the respondent 
when evidence of such discrimination is brought” (n. 18). 28                                                           ANTONIO LO FARO 
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content  follows the same line. When persons who consider themselves 
wronged “establish facts from which it may be presumed that there has 
been direct or indirect discrimination, it shall be for the respondent to 
prove that there has been no breach of the principle of equal 
treatment”.
107 
Undoubtedly, it would not be possible to assert that the Burden of 
Proof Directive matches up to all the expectations many had placed on 
it.
108 Furthermore, its scope is framed in such a way as to exclude the 
possibility for it to “cross” the boundaries of equal treatment within which 
the legislative provisions are confined. In fact, Article 3 explicitly states 
that the Directive shall apply (only) “to the situations covered by Article 
119 of the Treaty and by Directives 75/117/EEC, 76/207/EEC and, insofar 
as discrimination based on sex is concerned, 92/85/EEC and 96/34/EC”. 
Unlike what one could presume them to be with regard to the 
jurisprudential principles proclaimed in cases such as Von Colson, 
Johnston, Steenhorst-Neerings, Fantask, Magorrian, Preston, the 
Directive’s provisions do not seem open to an extensive interpretation 
which could allow them to be applied  to other areas of Community labour 
law as well. Whereas those principles do answer to requirements which 
are common to  enforcement of the whole of Community social 
legislation, the legislative provisions of the Burden of Proof Directive - 
meagre as they are - are to be considered as confined to the field of 
equal treatment. 
 
3.2 Evidential rules built from the 91/533/EEC Directive 
Certainly less debated than the ‘equal treatment’ applications of the 
burden of proof issues, but probably more meaningful, at least as to their 
potentially wide-ranging extension, are other European developments in 
the field of burden of proof in employment-related matters.  
These developments - quite recent if compared to those analysed in 
the preceding section - date back to a piece of Community social 
legislation which was considered as not particularly relevant at the 
moment of its adoption, and which was later revalued by  jurisprudential 
developments. The Directive in question is  91/533/EEC on employers’ 
                                                 
107 Article 4.1 Burden of Proof Directive. 
108 Almost four years after its adoption, an opportunity to prove or to disprove the 
scepticism surrounding the real impact of the Directive was missed due to a lack of time. 
Called upon to decide on a burden of proof question in a sex discrimination case, the Court 
of Justice did not even mention the Directive in its judgement (case 381/99, Brunnhofer v 
Bank der österreichischen Postsparkasse AG, 26th June 2001, not yet reported in the ECR). 
This was due to the fact that the 1997 Directive could not be considered applicable to the 
events submitted in the case, dating back to the period 1994-97.  JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF EC LABOUR LAW 29 
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obligation to inform employees of the conditions applicable to the 
contract or employment relationship
109; the ECJ judgements  referred to 
here are those delivered in the Kampelmann and  Lange
110 cases, both 
arising from preliminary rulings referred by German courts. 
By obliging employers to provide employees with written information 
of the conditions applicable to their contract of employment
111, Article 2 
of the 1991 Directive raises the question of the probative value to be 
given to the information provided by the employer “not later than two 
months after the commencement of employment” (Article 3.1). 
In the Kampelmann case two German employees had applied for 
promotion to a higher grade but their applications were refused on the 
ground that the previous written assessment of their category had been 
incorrect and that their work corresponded to a lower category that did 
not qualify them for higher grading. 
The question posed by the Hamm Landesarbeitsgericht was whether 
the 1991 Community Directive  implied a reversal of the burden of proof, 
requiring the employer to prove that his previous written notification of 
grading was incorrect. In particular, the question was framed as follows: 
“is it the purpose of Article 2 of the Directive to modify the burden of 
proof in the employee’s favour, in that the list of minimum requirements 
in Article 2(2) is intended to ensure that the employee does not 
                                                 
109 “Cinderella Directive” was the label coined by (Clark and Hall 1992). (Kenner 1999) at 
205 talks of a Directive that was “obscure and unheralded at the time of its adoption”. 
110 Cases C-253/96, C-254/96, C-255/96, C-256/96, C-257/96 and C-258/96, Kampelmann 
and Others v Landschaftsverband Westfalen-Lippe, Stadtwerke Witten GmbH v Schade, 
Haseley v Stadtwerke Altena GmbH [1997] ECR I-6907; case C-350/99, Lange v. Georg 
Schünemann GmbH [2001] ECR I-1061.  
111 The information given by the employer shall cover, at least: 
“a) the identities of the parties; b) the place of work; where there is no fixed or main place 
of work, the principle that the employee is employed at various places and the registered 
place of business or, where appropriate, the domicile of the employer; c) (i) the title, grade, 
nature or category of the work for which the employee is employed; or (ii) a brief 
specification or description of the work; d) the date of commencement of the contract or 
employment relationship; e) in the case of a temporary contract or employment 
relationship, the expected duration thereof; f) the amount of paid leave to which the 
employee is entitled or, where this cannot be indicated when the information is given, the 
procedures for allocating and determining such leave; g) the length of the periods of notice 
to be observed by the employer and the employee should their contract or employment 
relationship be terminated or, where this cannot be indicated when the information is given, 
the method for determining such periods of notice; h) the initial basic amount, the other 
component elements and the frequency of payment of the remuneration to which the 
employee is entitled; i) the length of the employee's normal working day or week; j) where 
appropriate (i)the collective agreements governing the employee's conditions of work, or (ii) 
in the case of collective agreements concluded outside the business by special joint bodies 
or institutions, the name of the competent body or joint institution within which the 
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encounter difficulties of proof regarding the listed points when enforcing 
his contractual rights in employment law disputes?” 
Far from being a technical question related to a marginal piece of 
Community legislation, the question submitted to the European Court was 
a very momentous and potentially far-reaching one. Just to give a few 
examples, the right of a night worker to the free health assessment 
provided by Article 9.1.a of the Working Time Directive could be enforced 
more easily, to the extent that he will not be obliged to prove that he is a 
night-worker when the written statement so certifies. Still in the field of 
working time, an employee could profit from the probative value of the 
written statement if he chose to enforce his right not to modify his 
working hours unilaterally: in this case, he could indeed prove more 
easily that the agreed working time was different from the time claimed 
by his employer. In general terms, employees will always have the 
possibility of  easier judicial enforcement of their rights to the extent that 
they can prove more easily the terms and conditions applicable to their 
employment relationship. 
Before dealing with the answer given by the Court in Kampelmann, it 
is worth noting that the burden of proof questions being scrutinised in 
this section differ conceptually from those treated in the previous one. In 
the “equal treatment” line of judgements,  ECJ intervention was aimed at 
providing employees with adequate procedural means  to give full 
effectiveness to substantive rights conferred by the same directives the 
Court was called to interpret. On the contrary, what was considered in 
Kampelmann, was the need to provide employees with adequate 
procedural means  to give full effectiveness to a broader body of 
substantive rights, not restricted to one particular field of employment 
legislation. In fact, an interpretation of the written statement imposed by 
the Directive in terms of a document of proof against the employer could 
help to enforce substantive rights that are not conferred by EC law but 
are of national origin. As regards the field of employment law not covered 
by Community legislation, for instance, an employee would not need to 
prove that he or she is entitled to a certain remuneration to the extent 
that the initial basic amount and the other component elements of pay is 
one of the elements to be notified according to the 91/533 directive. 
Alternatively, still more significant, it would not be necessary for an 
employee to prove that his or her employment relationship is covered by 
the collective agreement referred to in the employer’s written statement. 
This is why the preliminary question submitted in Kampelmann could 
have represented a decisive step in the effective judicial enforcement of 
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procedural right” aimed at improving the enforcement of employees’ 
rights, whatever the source of those rights.  
The answers given by the Court in Kampelmann and more recently in 
Lange  are not without implications as far as the above issues are 
concerned, and they would  probably have deserved a greater doctrinal 
echo than they actually had
112. As a matter of fact, these were the only 
occasions on which the Court has dealt with  burden of proof issues in 
regard to employment matters not exclusively connected to equal 
treatment. 
Although the Court was well aware of the fact that the 1991 Directive 
was “without prejudice to national law and practice concerning proof,”
113 
this did not prevent it from asserting tenets assuming a certain 
significance in the perspective of effective judicial protection of 
substantive employment  rights. In fact, assuming - as the Court did - 
that the information contained in the written statement enjoyed a 
“presumption of correctness”
114 is just a different - smoother - way to 
recognise that the written statement does actually affect national rules 
concerning burden of proof.  
It is true that a careful application of the equivalence principle pushed 
the European Court to make it clear that the written statement 
considered by the Directive should (only) enjoy the same presumption of 
correctness that  “any similar document drawn up by the employer and 
communicated to the employee” would have in domestic law.
115 In this 
perspective, for instance, a similar or “equivalent” presumption of 
correctness was already recognised within the Dutch legal order
116 and, 
only as far as pay was concerned, within the French system. In this 
sense, it could be said that the Kampelmann  interpretation of the 
Directive is not that sensational, since it restricts itself to recognising the 
“Directive” written statement as having the same probative value that 
existing “national” written statements already had.  
Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that, before the Directive was 
adopted, not all  Member state legislation posed an employer’s obligation 
to provide employees with such a document. In addition, even where a 
                                                 
112 See (Kenner 1999) and (Rivara 1999) 
113 Article 6 Directive 91/533/EEC and Kampelmann, para 30 
114 Kampelmann, see note n. 110, para. 33. 
115 Kampelmann, para. 33. 
116 According to Article 184 of the Dutch code of civil procedure, a declaration by one party 
in a written document  must be held to be true, unless the contrary is proven. This implies 
that the worker can rely on this information insofar as the employer cannot prove it to be 
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similar obligation existed,
117 probably no national legislation at all obliged 
employers to provide such a detailed statement
118. 
As  has been recognised by commentators
119, the Kampelmann 
judgement is therefore to be seen as an important step towards  effective 
judicial protection. With all the caution imposed by the explicit obstacle of 
Article 6,
120 the Court could not help  realising that a strict interpretation 
of that proviso would have deprived the Community intent to “provide 
employees with improved protection against possible infringements of 
their rights and to create greater transparency on the labour market” of 
any effectiveness.
121 Consequently, it declared that the “objective [of the 
directive] would not be achieved if the employee were unable in any way 
to use the information contained in the notification referred to in Article 
2(1) as evidence before the national courts”.
122 The obstacle of Article 6 
was then circumvented by retaining that “the Directive does not itself lay 
down any rules of evidence”
123, but at the same by requiring the national 
courts to “apply and interpret their national rules on the burden of proof 
in the light of the purpose of the Directive”.
124 
What has been  illustrated so far is certainly not sufficient to affirm 
that the effect of the 1991 Directive was to reverse the burden of proof in 
the employee’s favour with regard to the contractual terms contained in 
the employer’s written statement
125. Nevertheless, it is just as  certain 
that with the judgements delivered in Kampelmann and Lange
126 the 
Court of Justice placed “a heavy burden of rebuttal on the employer 
seeking to disprove his own statement”.
127 Using wording very close to 
plain recognition of a reversal of the burden of proof, the Court stated 
that “The employer must be allowed to bring any evidence to the 
contrary, by showing that the information in the notification is either 
                                                 
117 For instance, in the UK, since the 1963 Contract of Employment Act.. 
118 See note n. 111. 
119 (Kenner 1999) and, with more emphasis, (Rivara 1999). 
120 “This Directive shall be without prejudice to national law and practice concerning:  
- the form of the contract or employment relationship, 
- proof as regards the existence and content of a contract or employment relationship,  
- the relevant procedural rules”. 
121 Considerandum n. 2 Directive 91/533/EEC. 
122 Kampelmann, para. 32. 
123 Kampelmann, para. 34. 
124 Kampelmann, para. 33. 
125 As was the case in the original Commission proposal - explicitly talking of a proof of 
employment Directive. See the complete reconstruction of the decision-making process 
leading to the 1991 Directive in (Kenner 1999). 
126 All the references and quotations are taken from the Kampelmann case. In Lange, they 
were entirely confirmed. 
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inherently incorrect or has been shown to be so in fact”
128. If the 
employer is to be allowed to bring any evidence to the contrary, one 
could add, it is implicitly affirmed that the written notification does have 
probative value, even though it would not be technically correct to talk of 
a full reversal of the burden of proof in the employee’s favour. 
 
4. Ex officio application of Community law 
The last issue that will be taken into consideration in this review of the 
“effective judicial protection” cases that have come before the European 
Court of Justice is the ex officio application of EC law; i.e. the possibility, 
or the duty, for a national court to examine of its own motion whether 
national legislation complies with Community law, had not the individual 
relied upon it
129. 
 
4.1 The power of national courts to apply Community law of their 
own motion  and their duty to do so 
The first time the ex officio issue was raised in front of the Court of 
Justice was in Verholen
130. In that case, a Dutch court asked the ECJ 
whether “Community law precludes the national courts from reviewing (of 
their own motion) a national legal provision in the light of an EEC 
directive, if an individual (possibly through ignorance) has not relied on 
the directive”. The answer of the Court of Justice was that “Community 
law does not preclude a national court from examining of its own motion 
whether national rules are in conformity with the precise and 
unconditional provisions of a directive, the period for whose 
implementation has elapsed, where the individual has not relied on that 
directive before the national court”
131. The answer was certainly not 
surprising: as no national procedural limitation hindered the ex officio 
application of Community law, the European Court could not but reiterate 
that the full effectiveness of Community law does certainly not prevent 
national judges from applying EC rules of their own motion. 
                                                 
128 Kampelmann, para. 34. 
129 It has been held – that  such an obligation – to the extent that it exists - could not be 
limited to directly effective provisions, but  should  rather be understood in such a way as as 
to oblige national courts to provide a  interpretation of national law of their own motion 
consistent with Community law (Prechal 1998). 
130 Joined cases C-87/90, C-88/90 and C-89/90, Verholen and others v Sociale 
Verzekeringsbank Amsterdam [1991] ECR I-3757. 
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Things were not that simple and straightforward in two following 
judgements
132, where the effectiveness problem was  brought about by 
the fact that  there did exist national procedural rules hindering  ex officio 
application of Community law. 
In van Schijndel, the questions raised by the Hoge Raad were manifold 
and extremely significant in their substantive content, since the dispute 
concerned  compulsory membership in occupational pension schemes, 
which some years later was to be the object of the celebrated Albany 
case
133. However, as far as effective judicial protection is directly 
concerned, the issue in question in van Schijndel can be summed up in 
two points. 
First - in a very similar way to what was asked in Verholen - the 
national judge asked whether a domestic court has the duty to apply EC 
provisions where the party to the proceedings with an interest in 
application of those provisions has not relied upon them. The only 
difference between the two preliminary rulings was therefore that in 
Verholen the Court was asked whether Community law precludes national 
courts from applying EC law of their own motion; whereas in van 
Schijndel it was asked whether Community law obliges national courts to 
do so. 
The answer to the second question was that Community law obliges 
national judges to apply EC rules of their own motion, but only to the 
extent that with a similar obligation exists in domestic law. The issue was 
therefore resolved through a plain application of the general principle of 
equivalence. When national courts have the power to raise of their own 
motion points of law which have not been raised by the parties, the same 
discretion exists as far as the ex officio application of Community law is 
concerned. Where, on the contrary, by virtue of domestic law, courts or 
tribunals must raise of their own motion points of law based on binding 
domestic rules which have not been raised by the parties, such an 
obligation also exists as far as binding Community rules are concerned.  
In other terms, what Verholen and van Schijndel stated is that both 
the possible and the obligatory nature of  ex officio application of 
Community law, subsist to the extent that they are provided for by 
national law. As for the concrete modalities whereby  ex officio 
application of Community law may be carried out, the Court made  it 
                                                 
132 Joined case C-430/93 and C-431/93, van Schijndel and van Veen v Stichting 
Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten [1995] ECR I-4705; case C-312/93, Peterbroeck, Van 
Campenhout & Cie SCS v Belgian State [1995] I-4599. The two  somewhat conflicting 
judgements were given on the same day,  14
th December 1995. 
133 Case C-67/96, Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie 
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clear that it may occur either through an application of direct effect or 
through the adoption of a Community-law-consistent interpretation of 
national legislation
134. 
 
As for this first facet of the ex officio question, van Schijndel differs 
from Verholen in that it brings in - albeit in a somewhat incidental way - 
the concept of “binding Community rules”. The duty for national judges to 
apply of their own motion Community law - provided such an obligation 
exists under national law - subsists only as far as the binding rules are 
concerned
135. 
On the interpretation of what is to be considered as an EC binding rule, 
however, the debate is open. It has always been difficult, within the 
national legal system, to identify which rules may be considered as an 
expression of public policy or d’ordre public. It is still more difficult to do 
so in a legal system such as that of the Community, where the concept of 
public policy may be harder to grasp.  
Recently, however, the notion of a Community rule of public policy 
seems to have been implied in a judgement where the duty of national 
courts to apply Community law of their own motion was  affirmed without 
making it depend on any similar domestic rule. In Océano Grupo 
Editorial,
136 the Court boldly affirmed that the effectiveness of Community 
consumer protection legislation requires national courts to determine of 
their own motion whether a term of a contract is unfair with regard to  
Directive 93/13/EC. Unlike van Schijndel, the Court of Justice did not 
submit the obligation of national courts to raise of their own motion 
points of law based on binding Community rules on condition that such an 
obligation also existed for binding domestic rules. On the contrary, it 
disregarded any consideration of equivalence in favour of a strong 
affirmation of the need to secure the full effectiveness of Community 
rules evidently considered as “binding”: “Effective protection of the 
consumer may be attained only if the national court acknowledges that it 
has power to evaluate terms of this kind of its own motion”
137. 
                                                 
134 As the Court recently stated in Fazenda Pública (case C-446/98, Fazenda Pública v 
Câmara Municipal do Porto, 14
th December 2000, not yet reported), “The power to raise of 
its own motion a question of Community law presupposes that the national court considers 
either that Community law must be applied and, if necessary, national law disapplied or that 
national law must be interpreted in a way that conforms with Community law” (para. 48). 
135 van Schijndel, para. 13. 
136 Joined cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Roció Murciano [2000] 
ECR I-4941. 
137 Océano Grupo Editorial, para. 26. On this judgement, and on the problems it is supposed 
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In Eco Swiss
138, the Court was still more explicit in qualifying a Treaty 
proviso (Article 85) as a rule of public policy. According to the Opinion of 
the Advocate General Saggio, national courts should regard the 
Community rules on competition as matters of “public policy” to the 
extent that the interests those rules tend to satisfy extends beyond 
private parties to other undertakings, potential competitors and 
consumers
139. It follows that, as a public policy rule, the application of 
Article 85 may justify the judicial annulment of an arbitration award even 
in those legal systems whose national rules of procedure allow an award 
to be annulled only on the grounds that it is contrary to public policy
140. 
As the Advocate General suggested and the Court then agreed, the need 
to supervise arbitration awards to ensure that they are compatible with 
Community law is particularly felt in an area such as competition, where 
there is a general interest in observance of the rules to ensure the 
smooth functioning of the common market
141 
Océano Grupo Editorial and Eco Swiss are two of those cases where 
the uncertain notion of a binding Community  rule as an expression of  
Community public policy laboriously begins to emerge. Yet one cannot 
but agree with those commentators who note that sooner or later the 
Community legislator and/or the Court of Justice “will have to decide 
which provisions of Community law are d’ordre public”.
142  It does not 
seem not odd to argue that in this demanding task they can now find a 
concrete reference in the EU Charter of fundamental rights, “since the 
public policy character is often linked to the fundamental nature of the 
provision at issue”.
143 
 
4.2 Procedural rules hindering the ex officio application of 
Community law by national courts 
If the first issue which arose in van Schijndel may be considered as the 
physiology - or the normal functioning - of the ex officio application of 
                                                                                                                              
advance the legal authorities on which they base their claims as well as the facts which give 
rise to their dispute”, see (Whittaker 2001). 
138 Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV [1999] I-3055. 
139 Eco Swiss, Opinion of the Advocate General, para. 34-39. 
140 Eco Swiss, para.41. 
141 Eco Swiss, Opinion of the Advocate General, para. 35, who then continued: “When the 
problem arises within national legal orders of balancing potentially conflicting requirements, 
such as the requirement to observe national procedural rules, on the one hand, and the 
functioning of a competitive market, on the other, the prime importance accorded to the 
competition rules in the Community legal order must always be taken into account in 
seeking that balance” (para 38). 
142 (Prechal 1998) at 705. 
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Community law, the second issue relates to its pathology, that is to say, 
those situations in which national procedural rules prevent national 
judges from complying with their duty to apply on their own motion a 
point of Community law not required by the parties. 
In the first two phases of the dispute taking place in the lower courts, 
Mr. Van Schijndel’s claim to be exempted from compulsory membership 
of an occupational pension scheme had not been grounded on the 
compatibility of such a compulsory membership with Community 
competition law. When the case finally arrived before the Hoge Raad,
144 
Mr. Van Schijndel’s barristers realised that Community law could be of 
some help in supporting the application of their client. Accordingly, they 
founded their Cassation plea on the contention that the Court of Appeal 
should have considered of its own motion the question of the 
compatibility of compulsory membership with Articles 85 and 86 and 90 
of the Treaty.
145 Too late? 
The Hoge Raad judges found that the applicants were actually bringing 
into the proceedings “new” facts and circumstances, not previously raised 
before the lower courts; something that is not allowed by  Dutch 
procedural law. Moreover - and leaving the “new facts and 
circumstances” issue aside - they doubted whether the lower court should 
have considered the Community point of law of its own motion, since   
Dutch procedural law is governed by the principle of judicial passivity, 
requiring courts not to go beyond the ambit of the dispute as defined by 
the parties themselves. 
In short, what was discussed in van Schijndel was a conflict between 
the principles of effective judicial protection (under its guise of  ex officio 
application of Community law), and national procedural autonomy (under 
the guise of the obligation for the courts to limit themselves to the ambit 
of the dispute as defined by the parties).  
The conflict was resolved by the European Court through  application 
of the “practically impossible-excessively difficult” test. Inaugurating a 
series of ad hoc assessments about the reasonableness of various 
national procedural rules hindering the effectiveness of Community law, 
the Court stated that in order to ascertain whether or not national 
procedural law renders the application of Community law impossible or 
excessively difficult, reference must be made “to the role of that provision 
in the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a whole, 
before the various national instances. In the light of that analysis the 
basic principles of the domestic judicial system, such as protection of the 
                                                 
144 The Dutch Court of Cassation. 
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rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper 
conduct of procedure, must, where appropriate, be taken into 
consideration”.
146 
The application of this kind of balanced consideration led the Court of 
Justice to assert that the national court’s obligation to base its decision 
only on the facts put before it by the parties is justified to the extent that 
such a principle “reflects conceptions prevailing in most of the Member 
States as to the relations between the State and the individual; it 
safeguards the rights of the defence; and it ensures proper conduct of 
proceedings by, in particular, protecting them from the delays inherent in 
examination of new pleas”.
147 It follows, according to the European Court, 
that the passive role assigned to judges in resolving national disputes 
concerned with the application of Community law does not jeopardise the 
effectiveness of Community law; or, rather, that this kind of risk should 
be accepted in the name of national procedural autonomy.  
Anyway, as always happens when a case-by-case approach is adopted, 
things are not predictable. They are so unpredictable, in fact,  that a 
different conclusion on a similar case was given by the Court on the very 
same day van Schijndel was decided.  
In Peterbroeck,
148 the impossibility for a national court to raise points 
of Community law of its own motion had again been submitted to the 
attention of the European Court. In a very similar way to van Schijndel, 
that impossibility was due to a “new plea” kind of obstacle. The only 
difference was that in van Schijndel the national procedural rule 
obstructing a new plea was constituted by the fact that Netherlands law  
excludes pleas in Cassation requiring a new examination of the facts. 
Whereas in Peterbroeck the national procedural rule obstructing a new 
plea was constituted by the fact that Belgian law prevents applicants from 
raising in the trial points of law not included in the complaint document 
as initially lodged or subsequently (within sixty days) modified. 
Although the procedural causes preventing a new plea were different,  
the substantive effect was identical: that of preventing national courts 
                                                 
146 v an Schijndel, para. 19. With regard to the slightly different question concerning the 
identification of the less favourable procedural rule, a very similar ad hoc approach was 
adopted in Levez, note 35, where the Court stated that whenever it falls to be determined 
whether a procedural rule of national law is less favourable than those governing similar 
domestic actions, the national court must take into account the role played by that provision 
in the procedure as a whole, as well as the operation and any special features of that 
procedure before the different national courts” (para. 44). The same reply was given by the 
Court in Preston, note 41, para. 61. This kind of approach, modulated on a case-by-case 
basis, is defined by (Prechal 1998) as a “procedural rule of reason test”. 
147 van Schijndel, para. 21. 
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from raising of their own motion a point of Community law not raised by 
the parties. Notwithstanding the evident analogies, the two “twin” 
judgements had opposite conclusions
149: whereas in van Schijndel the 
Dutch procedural limitation was considered as compatible with the 
effectiveness of Community law, in Peterbroeck  the Belgian procedural 
limitation was set aside
150. 
The apparent contradiction was explained by referring to a factor - 
present in Peterbroeck  and absent in van Schijndel - that the Court 
considered as decisive. According to the Luxembourg judges, the 
maintenance of the Belgian procedural limitation would have prevented 
the national judiciary from any possibility of raising Article 177 (now 234) 
preliminary reference 
151. The ECJ noted that the referring Brussels Cour 
d’Appel  was the first court which could have made a reference, since in 
the Belgian system the first complaints of taxpayers are made to a fiscal 
authority which is not a court within the meaning of Article 177. 
Moreover, the ECJ considered that the same Cour d’Appel could also have 
been  the last court having the possibility to refer a preliminary question, 
since no other national court in subsequent proceedings would have been 
able to consider the question of its own motion. This is why the Court 
deemed that in this case it was necessary to set aside the national 
procedural limitation preventing the Cour d’Appel from raising of its own 
motion the point of Community law and, therefore,  raising a preliminary 
procedure before the Court of Justice. 
According to some commentators, the preliminary reference argument 
was not an adequate justification for differentiating between the 
conflicting solutions given by the Court in van Schijndel and  Peterbroeck. 
In fact, if the preclusion from referring preliminary rulings was the reason 
that induced the Court to set aside the national procedural rule which 
excluded an ex officio application of Community law, exactly the same 
could have been said in van Schijndel, where, on the contrary, a similar 
kind of national limitation was maintained.  
                                                 
149 The problematic coupling of van Schijndel and  Peterbroeck  as regards the uniform 
application of EC law is stigmatised by (De Búrca 1997). 
150 The Court stated that Community law precludes application of a domestic procedural rule 
whose effect is to prevent the national court from considering of its own motion whether a 
measure of domestic law is compatible with a provision of Community law when the latter 
provision has not been invoked by the litigant within a certain period (Peterbroeck, para. 
21). 
151 Obviously, what was alluded to was the possibility of referring a “substantive” 
preliminary ruling, aimed at verifying the compatibility of national tax law - and not merely 
of national procedural rules - with Community law. The Belgian Cour  d’Appel, actually, did 
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In addition,  another justification of the different solutions given in the 
two cases cannot be considered acceptable. With a view to strengthening 
further the argument concerning the impossibility to refer, the Court of 
Justice underlined that the first national authority dealing with the 
Peterbroeck case - a Regional Director of the Belgian tax office - was not 
a tribunal for the purposes of Article 177. Yet another reason  for giving 
the Cour d’Appel the opportunity to make a reference, according to the 
Court of Justice
152. 
This argument, already challenged by critical commentators,
153 was 
however discharged by the  same Court of Justice in a later case.  
In the already mentioned Eco Swiss case,
154 a situation very similar to 
that of Peterbroeck had come about. The first “court” dealing with the Eco 
Swiss  case was an arbitration tribunal, and therefore - according to   
consolidated jurisprudence
155 - not in a position to make any preliminary 
ruling. The second court was indeed an “Article 177 court”, but its faculty 
to raise a preliminary ruling was prevented by the elapse of the three-
month time limit provided for claiming the judicial annulment of the 
award given by the arbitrators. The result of the two circumstances was 
that - precisely as had occurred in Peterbroeck - the possibility of raising 
a preliminary ruling was totally lost for that dispute.  
The question submitted in Eco Swiss was therefore whether 
Community law required the rules of national procedural law to be set 
aside if this was necessary in order to judicially review an arbitration 
award supposed to conflict with (public policy rules of
156) Community law.  
                                                 
152 According to (Hoskins 1996) at 375, the different result reached in the two cases may be 
explained by the fact that the lower court in van Schijndel  had the power to raise a 
Community point of its motion but did not exercise it, whereas in Peterbroeck the lower 
“court” did not have any such power at all. This opinion seems to disregard the fact that in 
van Schijndel the lower court too was “presumably equally as bound by its passive role”  
and could not therefore raise any point of Community law (De Búrca 1997) at 44. Anyway, 
it was not the impossibility of raising of its own a Community point as such that drove the 
Court to set the national limitation aside in Peterbroeck.  Rather, it was the consequent 
impossibility of raising a preliminary procedure; in this regard, the facts of the two cases 
were quite similar. Contra, (Van Gerven 2000b) at 532 considers that “in van Schijndel the 
domestic law provision in issue was not depriving Article 234 (ex 177) of its substance, 
whereas in Peterbroeck the domestic law provision, as it was understood by the Court, did 
have that effect”. 
153 “Why should the issue of whether or not the lower court had power to refer be relevant 
to the issue of whether the parties ought to have raised the point of EC law, or to the issue 
of whether the Court on appeal should subsequently be entitled to raise the point of EC law 
of its own motion? (De Búrca 1997) at 44. 
154 See note n. 138. 
155 Case 102/81, Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei Gmbh v Reederei Mond [1982] ECR 
1095. 
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The answer given by the Court of Justice in Eco Swiss openly 
contradicted the one given in the similar Peterbroeck case. Whereas in 
the latter case the Court had deemed that the non-judicial nature of the 
first “court” determined the impossibility of referring when the second 
court was also prevented from doing so by a national procedural 
limitation, in the former case its judgement was opposite. According to 
Eco Swiss, domestic procedural rules which restrict the possibility of 
applying for annulment of an arbitration award are fully justified by the 
basic principles of the national judicial system, such as the principle of 
legal certainty and acceptance of the res judicata
157, no matter whether  
maintaining  the national procedural limitation makes it totally impossible 
to raise a preliminary ruling for the dispute concerned. 
Leaving aside the merits of the single questions, a more general 
evaluation of  effective judicial protection jurisprudence cannot be 
omitted at the end of this chapter. Just as was the case with the issues 
regarding time limits (§. 2), with regard to ex officio application of 
Community law  it is difficult to avoid noting a lack of uniformity in the 
judicial developments relating to effectiveness. Whereas the lack of 
external  uniformity  among national procedures and remedies is an 
understandable result of a Community policy which has never been keen 
on procedural harmonisation, or at least always aware of its difficulties
158; 
the lack of internal uniformity within the Court of Justice jurisprudence 
seems on the contrary much less comprehensible or justifiable.  
It is not only national procedural limitations as such that may render 
the exercise of Community rights “excessively difficult”. An ever-changing 
understanding of their compatibility with Community law  may also 
render effective judicial protection less than easy. 
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